Re: [sig-policy] [Sig-policy] prop-062-v001: Use of final /8
On Jul 21, 2008, at 4:30 PM, Geoff Huston wrote:
prop-62 tries to give one suggestion as to what we should do with
this
"precious" last /8 that APNIC will receive if prop-55 is approved.
I'm
sure other folks will come up with other ideas, and I'm sure some
folks
will be quite happy with the first come first served that we have
now.
And the problem is that in attempting to introduce a new distribution
system that performs some form of rationing we need to look at the
effects of rationing. Rationing tends to be a highly ineffectual
distribution system - the goods remain 'cheap' but they are scarce.
Hi Geoff,
May I suggest an alternate interpretation? IPv4 addresses may be
scarce, but IP addresses in general are not -- in fact if one
considers (IPv4+IPv6) to be the actual pool, then they are fabulously
abundant. That said, the *only* practical way to recognize or unlock
this "true abundance" is if some small quantity of IPv4 remains
available to every future IPv6 taker, at least ever one that emerges
for the next few years -- or until such time that than a "pure IPv6"
network faces no greater risk of experiencing reachability problems
than an equivalent IPv4 network.
On this interpretation, there is no new distribution system, no new
rationing arrangement, and no new efficiency concerns.
Rationing encourages hoarding as a natural reaction from the consumer.
In this scenario, who would be the consumer? If it is competitive
private suppliers of IPv4 address space, who would be unwilling to
sell IPv4 in new entrant-sized chunks on terms that would be
competitive with the proxied/hybrid IPv4/IPv6 networks envisioned by
prop-062-v001, then where is the harm? As a result of the proposal
under discussion, more new entrants move more quickly to number the
vast majority of their resources with IPv6 rather than with backward-
looking IPv4. I suppose one could argue that other incumbent IPv4-
based networks that are both unwilling to grow via IPv6, and also
unwilling to pay the "hoarding-adjusted" prices demanded by their
peers could be harmed... is that your implication?
Rationing tends to encourage secondary markets where the same goods
are priced according to their scarcity value.
Absence of rationing also produces that result, does it not?
Because of the effects
of hoarding, the secondary markets tend to operate at a level
of scarcity premium far in excess of the actual relative scarcity
level.
Okay, so the analysis above is not far off. I look forward to further
clarification!
Another approach is to perform discriminatory distribution, where
the goods are available only on a selective basis to certain parties
who qualify, and not to others. In this case the issue is that those
with the greatest need, expressable as 'ability to pay' may not
be the same as those who receive the goods. Two problems are overtly
apparent with such a system. By selectively meeting the needs of some
consumers and not others you are making social policies - or in
this context you are making industry policies. I have my doubts that
this group is the appropriate group to determine such policies
and implement them through address distribution practices -
conventionally
this is undertaken at a national level through legislatures and
implemented
through regulation. Secondly the practice tends to encourage secondary
markets where the same goods are priced according to their scarcity
value, and again the secondary markets operate at a distorted
price level for much the same reasons as the rationing scheme.
Perhaps the issue here is one of illustrating that no matter
how we attempt to impose rationing or selective distribution
of this "final /8" as proposed in prop-055 we encounter these issues.
There is an argument drawn from economic theory that no
form of rationing or discriminatory distribution is efficient
in terms of the outcomes of such a distribution function. This
leads to the corollary that while reserving this last /8 in
prop-055 feels emotionally like a good thing to do in order
to provide some form of "safeguard" against some unspecified
future event, the problem is that we really are finding it
difficult to augment this emotional thought with a rational
and sensible means of actually using this resource effectively
that avoids the outcomes referred to above.
I think the interpretation described above, of the proposed IPv6
reservation as a *technical* mechanism to "unlock" the true abundance
of the total pool of public IPv4 + IPv6 addresses is, at least,
equally valid and compelling -- and far more practical -- then the
alternative view that it is covert social or industrial policy. It is
perfectly consistent with the rationale that has been in place for
over a decade, i.e., that public address resource allocation rules
represent nothing more than the administrative superstructure required
in order for the address resources to fulfill the purpose(s) for which
they were designed. In other words, if it wasn't social engineering
before, it's not not.
One might argue that it was, in fact, was social engineering all along
-- but the precedent is there nonetheless.
Best,
Tom