[sig-policy] New Proposal prop-138-v001: Restricting AS-ID in ROA
Dear SIG members,
The proposal "prop-138-v001: Restricting AS-ID in ROA" has been
sent to the Policy SIG for review.
It will be presented at the Open Policy Meeting (OPM) at APNIC 52
on Thursday, 16 September 2021.
https://conference.apnic.net/52/program/schedule/#/day/4
We invite you to review and comment on the proposal on the mailing
list before the OPM.
The comment period on the mailing list before the OPM is an important
part of the Policy Development Process (PDP). We encourage you to
express your views on the proposal:
- Do you support or oppose this proposal?
- Does this proposal solve a problem you are experiencing? If so,
tell the community about your situation.
- Do you see any disadvantages in this proposal?
- Is there anything in the proposal that is not clear?
- What changes could be made to this proposal to make it more effective?
Information about this proposal is appended below and also available at:
http://www.apnic.net/policy/proposals/prop-138
Regards,
Bertrand and Ching-Heng
APNIC Policy SIG Chairs
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prop-138-v001: Restricting AS-ID in ROA
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Proposer: Aftab Siddiqui (aftab.siddiqui@gmail.com)
1. Problem statement
--------------------
RFC6482 - A Profile for Route Origin Authorisations (ROAs) defines the
content of a ROA and one of the field is called "asID" Autonomous System
Identifier. It is defined in the RFC as "The asID field contains the AS
number that is authorised to originate routes to the given IP address
prefixes."
asID is an Integer value and the RFC doesn't restrict the range of
numbers which can be placed here but technically only allocated ASNs
should only be allowed to be added as "asID" or "Origin AS". APNIC ROA
management system allows any number between 0 - 4294967295, which
includes many ranges of Private ASNs, Reserved ASNs and unallocated ASNs
as well. This may lead to creating ROAs with Origin AS which should not
be in the global routing table.
2. Objective of policy change
-----------------------------
Restrict APNIC members to create ROAs with private, reserved or
unallocated ASN.
3. Situation in other regions
-----------------------------
In process of verifying this information.
4. Proposed policy solution
---------------------------
Route Origin Authorisation (ROA) is an RPKI object signed by a prefix
holder authorising origination of said prefix from an origin AS
specified in said ROA. It verifies whether an AS is authorised to
announce a specific IP prefix or not. ROA contains 3 mandatory fields
Prefix, Origin AS and Maxlength.
Prefix: The prefix you would like to originate from the specified ASN.
IPv4 and IPv6 Prefixes listed under "Internet Resources" on My APNIC
portal can be only be used here.
Origin AS: The authorised ASN which can originate the "Prefix". The
origin AS can only be from the IANA specified range and MUST not contain
an ASN from:
- 23456 # AS_TRANS RFC6793
- 64496-64511 # Reserved for use in docs and code RFC5398
- 64512-65534 # Reserved for Private Use RFC6996
- 65535 # Reserved RFC7300
- 65536-65551 # Reserved for use in docs and code RFC5398
- 65552-131071 # Reserved
- 4200000000-4294967294 # Reserved for Private Use RFC6996
- 4294967295 # Reserved RFC7300
And any IANA unallocated ASN.
5. Advantages / Disadvantages
-----------------------------
Advantages:
This will help APNIC members avoid mistakenly creating unnecessary Bogon
ROAs.
Disadvantages:
Overhead in implementing Origin AS check.
6. Impact on resource holders
-----------------------------
APNIC has to request members to delete existing Bogon ROAs, as of 5th
August 2021 there are around 30+ Bogon ROAs of APNIC delegated resources.
7. References
-------------
None.