Re: [sig-policy] prop-106-v001: Restricting excessive IPv4 address trans
>
> - The changes may increase an incentive of underground transfers.
If my memory serves, one of the important points to come out of all of the transfer policy discussion was that if a "legitimate" transfer is "too hard", the resources will be "transferred" (read: used/leased/borrowed/swapped for a dozen/whatever in the long-term by another entity) anyway, without notification to the RIR(s) concerned.
I kinda feel like we've been down this path before.
> 4. Details
> ----------
>
> There are options to handle this problem.
>
> Option 1: Restrict IPv4 address transfers under the final /8 address
> block for two years.
>
> - Prohibits transfers of the address block for two years after
> receiving the distribution under the final /8 address block.
>
>
> Option 2: Set a deposit for transfers under the final /8 range.
>
> - Pay ten years of APNIC's annual fees for transfered address
> block in advance when receiving the final /8 address range
> by address transfer or account name change.
>
> If an APNIC account holder transfers the final /8 range, the
> rights associated with the advanced payment of the annual fees
> will get dissolved, and the transfer recipient must pay the
> annual fees just the same as regular APNIC account holders.
I can't see that either of these options will solve the problem as described, and both of them aggravate the "hidden transfer" problem.
Under the first option, a potential recipient of a transfer has no choice but to use the resources without informing APNIC. Under the second option, there is a strong financial incentive for them to behave in the same way.
Trying to restrict a transfer of resources after the resources have been legitimately allocated to a new member seems like frantically welding the gate shut after the horse has bolted. If there is a problem here, then like others, I'd like to see some data before we jump into solving it.
-Mike