08/16/04 07:07:39 Fast traceroute 220.127.116.11
Trace 18.104.22.168 ...
1 10.84.224.1 19ms 12ms 13ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
2 22.214.171.124 12ms 11ms 10ms TTL: 0 (ip68-2-4-73.ph.ph.cox.net ok)
3 126.96.36.199 12ms 12ms 14ms TTL: 0 (ip68-2-0-37.ph.ph.cox.net ok)
4 188.8.131.52 14ms 14ms 15ms TTL: 0 (ip68-2-0-113.ph.ph.cox.net ok)
5 184.108.40.206 48ms 15ms 14ms TTL: 0 (chnddsrc02-gew0303.rd.ph.cox.net ok)
6 220.127.116.11 17ms 28ms 16ms TTL: 0 (chndbbrc02-pos0101.rd.ph.cox.net ok)
7 18.104.22.168 14ms 17ms 28ms TTL: 0 (p1-0.hsa1.phx1.bbnplanet.net ok)
8 22.214.171.124 17ms 14ms 18ms TTL: 0 (so-6-2-0.mp2.Phoenix1.Level3.net ok)
9 126.96.36.199 4ms 26ms 24ms TTL: 0 (as-0-0.bbr1.LosAngeles1.Level3.net ok)
10 188.8.131.52 25ms 27ms 26ms TTL: 0 (so-7-0-0.gar1.LosAngeles1.Level3.net ok)
11 184.108.40.206 26ms 23ms 25ms TTL: 0 (att-level3-oc48.LosAngeles1.Level3.net ok)
12 220.127.116.11 24ms 27ms 27ms TTL: 0 (tbr2-p012101.la2ca.ip.att.net probable bogus rDNS: No DNS)
13 18.104.22.168 26ms 25ms 22ms TTL: 0 (gar1-p3100.lsnca.ip.att.net probable bogus rDNS: No DNS)
14 22.214.171.124 25ms 24ms 25ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
15 126.96.36.199 1091ms 1219ms 828ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
16 188.8.131.52 105ms 86ms 50ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
17 184.108.40.206 96ms 96ms 76ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
18 220.127.116.11 93ms 63ms 67ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
19 18.104.22.168 75ms 94ms 76ms TTL: 49 (No rDNS)
Consider this traceroute that I took several minutes ago, Hop #14 is ATT, Hop #15 is dark space. Please check the date (against the date of the traceroute later in this email trail), ATT has been routing dark space for about 3 weeks now, and they have been notified. Is this an isolated instance? Maybe (hopefully). But they have not been very proactive on this one particular address.
It is also interesting to note the infrastructure this has from hop #15 through hop #19. They are all dark address space, all APNIC IP addresses. I have published this before several weeks ago and nothing has happened.
It has been estimated by various studies that dark space accounts for upwards of 15% of Internet traffic. Some one is routing this traffic - it has an Internet presence. 15% is not insignificant.
Apparently people have found it useful to allocate to themselves whatever space they feel they need. In finding a way to have it routed, essentially provides them with a web presence that does not violate any ISP's APU, since they are not connected in the normal fashion.
I submit that ATT is routing dark address space, nothing is being done about it, it is probably being treated as a cost of doing business, and ATT has been around for a very long time. I do not know the particulars in this specific instance, all I can do is look at the traceroute and the period of time this instance has been active and come to the obvious conclusions. What recourse does APNIC have in regaining control of their unallocated IP address that is currently being used?
ATT is essentially providing value to the people using this dark address space, at the expense of everyone.
It might be interesting to find out the following:
- Through a random survey of unallocated APNIC addresses, how many
are being used?
- Who is routing them?
- How did they become to be routed?
- What process can be created to have the addresses returned to
- What can be done to prevent their routing in the first place?
Jeff Williams wrote:
* sig-policy: APNIC SIG on resource management policy *Phillip and all, I don't for a moment believe that many ISP's are going to implement any routing policy they did not feel was in their customers best interests as well as had a hand in determining. If they do and it becomes known they will not be in business very long. Philip Smith wrote:Regards,Hi Izumi, At 16:02 10/08/2004 +0900, Izumi Okutani wrote:I have one additional question, which may be more appropriate to ask APNIC Secretariat - would NIRs be expected to implement the same policy once this reaches consensus? I am asking this since we have our own policy making process within JP, and our process differs depending on what is expected on NIRs.I think everyone has to implement this policy if it reaches consensus. It will only work if the RIRs & NIRs basically decide what the ISPs can and cannot route. And if it is approved in the AP region, it has to be approved in the other three RIR regions to have any impact at all; unless the proposed policy is intended to be binding on all routes the member ISPs provide transit to. Otherwise the miscreants which this policy proposal seeks to freeze out of the Internet will simply go outside of the region. As I see it, it will change the membership agreement each LIR has with APNIC, and the membership of the NIR have with the NIR. Basically giving the RIRs and NIRs internationally binding legal powers to influence their members' businesses. A pretty fundamental change in APNIC's existing address assignment policy, never mind uncharted waters for international law enforcement wrt the Internet. Which laws does APNIC as an Australian organisation use to stop an ISP in another country from "illegally announcing address space"? I'm no lawyer, but seeing the ICC being ignored by some countries doesn't give me much reason for optimism. philip --* sig-policy: APNIC SIG on resource management policy *Izumi JPNIC From: APNIC Secretariat <secretariat at apnic dot net> Subject: [sig-policy] Forwarded reply from Gordon Bader Date: Mon, 09 Aug 2004 10:16:57 +1000The email below is forwarded to the list on behalf of Gordon Bader. He is now subscribed to the list. regards, APNIC Secretariat.Date: Fri, 06 Aug 2004 07:15:16 -0700 From: GB <gbader at cox dot net> To: Izumi Okutani <izumi at nic dot ad dot jp> CC: secretariat at apnic dot net, sig-policy at apnic dot net,sig-policy-chair at apnic dot netSubject: Re: [sig-policy] SIG Policy Proposal 'Preventing the routing of 'dark' address space Good Morning Mr. Okutani and APNIC Secretariat, Thank you for reading the proposal and your associated questions on the sig-policy proposal 'Preventing the routing of 'dark' address space'. I have responded in line using the tag [Response] below for each one of your concerns. I have also included an example. Izumi Okutani wrote:Dear Gordon/APNIC secretariat, I understand the issue you have raised, but I still can't quite understand your proposal. Could you please clarify what specific actions you expect APNIC and possibily, the community members to take? I've also added my comments inline. From: APNIC Secretariat <secretariat at apnic dot net> Subject: [sig-policy] SIG Policy Proposal 'Preventing the routing of'dark' address spaceDate: Wed, 04 Aug 2004 17:39:27 +1000This proposal is being sent to the mailing list on behalf of GordonBader<gbader at cox dot net>. Feedback and comments about this proposal arewelcome onthis mailing list. regards, APNIC Secretariat. --- ______________________________________________________________________ prop-023-v001: A proposal to prevent the routing of "dark" address space ______________________________________________________________________ Proposed by: Gordon Bader <gbader at cox dot net> Version: 1.0 Date: 4 August 2004 Introduction: "Dark" address space is unallocated IP address space. Bandwidth originating from "dark" address space should not be routed at anylevel.Summary: Bandwidth originating from unallocated IP address space is being used for SPAM. In addition, unallocated IP address space is being used to host websites that support SPAM. APNIC has the ability to grant IP space. Given that ability, it also has the inherent ability to remove what was granted. The implicit grant of IP space, carries with it the ability to route, and route in a "legal" manner. When "illegal" (dark address space) routing is detected, then the price should be loss of the initial grant - in this case the ability to operate which carries with it economic measures. Details: Routing tables should be configured for non routing (filtering) of unallocated IP address space as well as allocated IP address space. Traffic to and from unallocated (or allocated but unused) IP address space should be dropped as soon as recognized, thus saving bandwidth up channel.Are you proposing ISPs in the community to apply the above policy, or is this simply an explanation of something which should be done, and not a part of the proposal? If it's the first, I think it is out of scope of the address policy.[Response] - Yes, I am essentially proposing the first at ALL levels of routing. I do understand that this would be larger than APNIC's reach and would need to be applied Internet wide. I am proposing this be applied to ALL who receive their IP address allocations from APNIC directly or indirectly. Included within the proposal are the Tier 1 backbone providers as well as individual ISP. I have attached an example of what I am proposing below. However I do believe that it would be within APNIC's address policy because if APNIC was able to initially assign the IP address space to begin with, APNIC should be able to remove the address space it originally assigned.Employ the basic law - what can be given, can be taken away. APNIC should issue a warning first, followed by removal of IP space from the offending ISP or entity at what ever level. IP addresses are provided under a contract, thus using contract law, removal is possible.If the offending entities are using unallocated address blocks, I'm not sure what you mean by "removal". Would there be anything to remove if allocations were not made in the first place? I don't quite understand how APNIC can be invloved in this, and how effective it would be in addressing the problem. I hope you can clarify this a little bit more.[Response] - The proposal I have submitted proposes the loss of IP address space at the point where routing "drops off" in to "dark space". Let me provide an actual traceroute. As of a couple of minutes ago, node 19 22.214.171.124 was still active. That is 6 days after this traceroute was taken. I received an "Failure to Delivery Notice" for an email that I had not sent, that was a item of SPAM that directed the reader to the IP address 126.96.36.199. =============== 07/31/04 16:12:27 Fast traceroute 188.8.131.52 Trace 184.108.40.206 ... 1 10.84.224.1 12ms 13ms 17ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS) 2 220.127.116.11 11ms 13ms 13ms TTL: 0 (ip68-2-4-73.ph.ph.cox.net ok) 3 18.104.22.168 14ms 11ms 12ms TTL: 0 (ip68-2-0-37.ph.ph.cox.net ok) 4 22.214.171.124 12ms 14ms 15ms TTL: 0 (ip68-2-0-113.ph.ph.cox.net ok) 5 126.96.36.199 14ms 16ms 14ms TTL: 0 (chnddsrc02-gew0303.rd.ph.cox.net ok) 6 188.8.131.52 14ms 15ms 13ms TTL: 0 (chndbbrc02-pos0101.rd.ph.cox.net ok) 7 184.108.40.206 17ms 15ms 16ms TTL: 0 (p1-0.hsa1.phx1.bbnplanet.net ok) 8 220.127.116.11 14ms 17ms 23ms TTL: 0 (so-6-2-0.mp2.Phoenix1.Level3.net ok) 9 18.104.22.168 25ms 25ms 22ms TTL: 0 (as-0-0.bbr1.LosAngeles1.Level3.net ok) 10 22.214.171.124 28ms * 25ms TTL: 0 (so-7-0-0.gar1.LosAngeles1.Level3.net ok) 11 126.96.36.199 25ms 25ms 31ms TTL: 0 (att-level3-oc48.LosAngeles1.Level3.net ok) 12 188.8.131.52 28ms 27ms 23ms TTL: 0 (tbr1-p014001.la2ca.ip.att.net probable bogus rDNS: No DNS) 13 184.108.40.206 25ms 23ms 26ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS) 14 220.127.116.11 25ms 25ms 24ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS) 15 18.104.22.168 181ms 105ms 161ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS) 16 22.214.171.124 107ms 162ms 140ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS) 17 126.96.36.199 145ms 171ms 146ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS) 18 188.8.131.52 130ms 146ms 145ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS) 19 184.108.40.206 141ms 145ms 94ms TTL: 49 (No rDNS) ================= You will notice that starting with node 15 the address space is un allocated. Thus the last legal space rests with node 14 which now has a problem with their routing tables. I am proposing that notification be given (in this case) to 220.127.116.11 "holder" to repair their routing tables. If not acted upon within a reasonable period of time and possibly a number of similiar instances, then the "holder" of the 18.104.22.168 - 22.214.171.124 address space loose their IP assignment. Yes, I am proposing that in this example, the POSSIBLY that after 7 days of inaction after being notified, AT&T WorldNet Services would loose their IP allocation, if they received their IP allocation from APNIC. In this case they did not, and that is why I do understand that this would need to be adopted Internet wide. I am also interested to see how long 126.96.36.199 remains active after this email is sent. How might this work. There are a number of SPAM services that receive spam from their users. They parse the spam extracting the possible originating IP addresses of the spam, AND the IP addresses the SPAM is directing the reader to. I am proposing to take the extracted address the SPAM reader is sent to, traceroute it, determine the last legal IP address on the route and send an automated notification to that service provider, whom ever that may be. With respect to the question of "removal" of IP address space, I would propose the logical loss of routing to the IP address space in question. I hope I have answered your questions. Thank you very much, GordonIzumi JPNICPros/Cons: Pros: By adopting this policy, bandwidth utilization will be reduced.Criminalenterprises will no longer be served. Cons: Disadvantages include new routing tables of increasing complexity to handle the non routing issues associated with dark address space activities and the associated traffic generated. Effect on APNIC: Reduction in bandwidth handled and in it's associated rate of growth. * sig-policy: APNIC SIG on resource management policy*_______________________________________________ sig-policy mailing list sig-policy at lists dot apnic dot net http://mailman.apnic.net/mailman/listinfo/sig-policy______________________________________________________________________ Samantha Dickinson, Technical Editor <sam at apnic dot net> Asia Pacific Network Information Centre ph +61 7 3858 3100 http://www.apnic.net fx +61 7 3858 3199 ______________________________________________________________________* sig-policy: APNIC SIG on resource managementpolicy *_______________________________________________ sig-policy mailing list sig-policy at lists dot apnic dot net http://mailman.apnic.net/mailman/listinfo/sig-policy* sig-policy: APNIC SIG on resource management policy * _______________________________________________ sig-policy mailing list sig-policy at lists dot apnic dot net http://mailman.apnic.net/mailman/listinfo/sig-policy
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Jeffrey A. Williams
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