Orbit

On Apr 17, 2009, at 1:36 PM, John Schnizlein wrote:

I think you are right to observe that this, and probably even more creative, agreements among parties holding IPv4 address blocks are likely to occur "in the wild" when there are too few addresses for allocation from the free pools. I doubt that RIR policy will anticipate and/or control the full variety.

Therefor, the RIRs should give the most attention to keeping the most accurate records possible of who has the right to use - and therefor advertise - each block. This priority is relevant because RIRs do not actually have the ability to "stop transfers", just the ability to refuse to record them. For the good of the Internet globally, we should recognize that this priority is more important than any attempt to induce moral behavior in any region.

John

FWIW I agree with John. I think his description of the situation also helps to clarify the nature of the key challenge, i.e., how to maintain "the most accurate possible" registration records, and to ensure that that quality level (i.e., of completeness, timeliness, and accuracy of registration records) always meets or exceeds the minimum required to both (a) preserve general confidence in the uniqueness of number resources, and (b) fully satisfy the reasonable/legitimate global demand for identifiability of number resources. If these benchmarks cannot be maintained, then the Internet functions that depend on number resource uniqueness will be jeopardized, and/or other institutions will emerge to satisfy the unmet demand for uniqueness and identifiability. Thus, this is not (or only secondarily) a moral issue; it is a fundamental technical and institutional requirement.

The challenge lies in identifying some purely voluntary, private interest-driven mechanism that could satisfy these minimum technical requirements over time. One might envision this problem as being roughly equivalent to the challenge that a society might face if universal automobile registration were widely regarded as important (for various reasons, as it is in most countries), but no police- equivalent existed -- or had ever existed -- to monitor compliance, to serve as a passive but visible deterrent against non-compliance, and to take enforcement actions if/when necessary. In the absence of such a policing mechanism, how might a society that regarded registration as important seek to realize that objective?

How do APNIC community members expect handle this challenge?

TV

On 2009Apr17, at 1:08 PM, Skeeve Stevens wrote:

...

I am wondering. 050 is about resource transfers.

But does anyone have an opinion on resource leasing?

Example... I enter into a private agreement with a party to lease them an AS and the rights to route (or attempt to do so) a /21, and charge them a yearly fee.

050 stops transfers, but who cares about 050 if there are easier, simpler ways to accomplish the same thing – but better... I still own it in the end.

You could even have a broker that leased lots of excess address space from members for a certain period, and based on the scarcity, the size of the resource, then sub-leased it to different parties at rates according to demand at the time – kind of like the real estate rental market.

I guess the concept of leasing address space is already a standard one as most ISP’s I know, and in ones I have built, we have levied a fee on the end customer for larger than the default allocation as a cost recovery method of our APNIC fees in having them in the first place.

Thoughts?

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