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In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within ind.
Inferred improvements during May 2023: none inferred
Source Address Validation issues inferred during May 2023: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 24560 AIRTELBROADBAND 2016-03-12 2023-05-31 55836 RELIANCEJIO-IN 2017-03-03 2023-05-26 132976 KINGSBROADBAND 2018-09-17 2023-05-31 132960 MNET 2021-09-16 2023-05-25 45117 INPL-IN-AP 2023-03-12 2023-05-22 133469 MULTINET-IN 2023-05-14 2023-05-28
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=ind&no_block=...
Please send any feedback or suggestions to email@example.com