In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within ind.
Inferred improvements during Mar 2022:
ASN Name Fixed-By
138731 KOVAIFN 2022-03-12
Further information for the inferred remediation is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php
Source Address Validation issues inferred during Mar 2022:
ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
24560 AIRTELBROADBAND 2016-03-12 2022-03-25
55836 RELIANCEJIO-IN 2017-03-03 2022-03-16
132774 NISSBROADBAND 2017-04-27 2022-03-23
132976 KINGSBROADBAND 2018-09-17 2022-03-22
134026 ULTRANET 2020-08-27 2022-03-26
138731 KOVAIFN 2020-11-08 2022-03-04
136672 L7CPL 2022-03-24 2022-03-24
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=ind&no_block=...
Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info@caida.org
